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According to several authors in psychology and neurosciences, our ability to perceive 
affordances is subtended by motor simulation mechanisms. Such mechanisms provide 
dynamic representations of feasible actions, thus enabling to scale the surrounding 
structures on the behavioural repertoire and capacities supported by our body. This 
attractive hypothesis has been taken up in robotics, to build intelligent systems able to 
determine in advance if a given action would be successful given the current state of the 
environment and their own skills. 
Several arguments however suggest that the motor simulation framework is not 
sufficient to explain affordance perception: (i) it rests on a misunderstanding of what 
affordances are: not actions that are currently feasible, but actions that are possible; (ii) 
it is computationally unrealistic: motor simulation is too costly in terms of 
computational resources to explain how one can access prospectively to actions that are 
potentiated by surrounding structures; (iii) it only covers the part of the perceptual field 
within the scope of our attention, but the affordances we perceive do not reduce to the 
object or state of affairs our attention is focused on at time t; (iv) it can only work if a 
first layer of affordances is available: motor simulation cannot explain affordance 
perception, because its very functioning presupposes such perception. Other 
mechanisms must consequently be hypothesized. 
 
Keywords 




Motor simulation is undoubtedly a successful concept. The range of cognitive skills it 
could be involved in has considerably expanded since its first use in the field of motor 
control theories, and most researchers nowadays assume that it plays a prominent role in 
processes as diverse as motor control and motor planning (Johnson, 2000; Jeannerod, 
2001), mindreading (Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Decety & Stevens, 2009), language 
processing (Pulvermüller, 2005; Wheeler & Bergen, 2010), imitation-based skill 
learning (Goldman, 2005) or tool-use recognition (Johnson-Frey, 2004; Witt el al., 
2010). 
The range of cognitive skills covered by motor simulation has still expanded in past 
years with the claim that motor simulation mechanisms can also explain how one can 
develop perceptual knowledge of affordances, i.e. behavioural opportunities potentiated 
by the objects and structures of the environment. Garbarini & Adenzato (2004), for 
instance, state that the representation of objects ‘in relation to the type of action that 
[they afford] an interacting subject’ proceeds from ‘a mechanism of as-if neural 
simulation: while observing an object, the neural system is activated as-if the observer 
were interacting with it’. 
In the field of neuropsychology, this theoretical proposition – that we will refer 
hereinafter as the simulation theory of affordance perception (STAP) – was first 
formulated by Marc Jeannerod (Jeannerod 1994, 2001, 2003; Jeannerod et al, 1995). 
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According to Jeannerod, the function of motor simulation is ‘not only to shape the 
motor system in anticipation to execution, but also to provide the self with information 
on the feasibility and the meaning of potential actions’ (Jeannerod, 2001). Following 
Ungerleider & Mishkin (1982) and Goodale & Milner (1992), Jeannerod distinguishes 
two visual information processing pathways: (i) a semantic pathway, processing object 
attributes for action-independent tasks, as properties description or naming; and (ii) a 
pragmatic pathway, building action-related representations, i.e. ‘representing objects as 
goals for action’ (Jeannerod, 2003). The pragmatic pathway enables the brain to 
represent the action possibilities available at a given moment. By simulating actions 
directed to objects, e.g. reach or grasp actions, it is able to determine in advance if such 
actions can be done. 
The core principle of such an idea is not new. Kenneth Craik (1943), known to have 
laid the conceptual foundations of the computo-symbolic approach to cognition and  
mental model framework, already considered simulation a basic means for cognitive 
systems to model processes taking place in their environment, predict future events and 
organize their behaviour in a proactive way. In Craik’s opinion, the better way to predict 
the outcomes of a process is to “play” it in advance. Yet our brain does not have the 
resources or time required for a full-scale achievement, as a result only a simplified 
model of the real process is played and it is played virtually, through pure symbolic 
means. ‘If the organism carries a “small-scale model” of external reality and of its own 
possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which 
is the best of them, react to future situations before they arise, utilise knowledge of past 
events in dealing with the present and future, and in every way to react in a much fuller, 
safer, and more competent manner to the emergencies which face it.’ (Craik, 1943: 61) 
Since Jeannerod’s early description of pragmatic representations, STAP hypothesis 
has been refined and defended in more or less strong forms by several researchers in 
psychology and neurosciences (de’Sperati & Stucchi, 1997, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998; 
Gallese, 2000; Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Tucker & Ellis, 2001, 2004; Hesslow, 2002; 
Grush, 2003, 2004, 2007; Garbarini & Adenzato, 2004; Tipper et al., 2006; Cisek, 2007; 
Coello & Delevoye-Turrell, 2007; Witt & Proffitt, 2008; Delevoye-Turrell et al., 2010; 
Caligiore et al., 2010; Sinigaglia & Rizzolatti, 2011; Ellis et al., 2013) and in the field of 
robotics (Möller, 1999; Ziemke el al., 2005; Hesslow & Jirenhed, 2007; Hoffman, 2007; 
Erdemir et al., 2008; Schenck, 2009; Schenck et al., 2012). STAP has especially been 
used to explain perceptual access to affordances related to manual prehension process: 
how reachability and graspability of objects located in the peripersonal space can be 
perceived. In addition, it was radicalized by authors as Garbarini & Adenzato (2004), 
with the claim that motor simulation is the only way to develop knowledge of action 
possibilities made available by objects. 
Needless to say, STAP hypothesis addresses important theoretical issues. The ability 
to perceive what actions are achievable in the environment and to categorize objects 
accordingly is undoubtedly an essential cognitive skill in ecological context: to react 
correctly to situations, we must be able to anticipate what we can and cannot do given 
the available surrounding structures. We must consequently possess a precise 
knowledge of our behavioural capacities and attunements of those capacities to 
situations, objects and states of affairs. 
The problem is however to determine if motor simulation is requested to develop such 
knowledge. When considering the core function of the simulation mechanism, STAP’s 
claim appears justified: a virtual achievement of actions (Decety, 1996a; Jeannerod, 
2001) seems to be a straightforward means to evaluate their feasibility and anticipate 
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their consequences in a given context, i.e. to represent and evaluate counterfactuals, and 
categorize objects accordingly. 
Yet this claim is less obvious than it seems when taking carefully into account the 
empirical data available and the nature of what we perceive when we perceive 
affordances. STAP probably looks convincing at first sight because one tends to think 
that affordances being merely possible actions (we are not currently performing those 
actions, we could perform them), they necessarily need to be simulated to be conceived 
or perceived, i.e., to have a cognitive reality. But think about it: do we really have to 
simulate the actions we could perform with this or that structure to perceive such 
structure as enabling those actions? When we perceive a chair – an object affording 
sitting behaviour – is our brain playing covertly the action of sitting on this chair? In the 
following, I will present several arguments that clearly challenge such claims and 
weaken STAP’s explanatory significance: (i) it rests on a misunderstanding of what 
affordances are: not actions that are currently feasible, but actions that are possible; (ii) 
it is computationally unrealistic: motor simulation is too costly in terms of 
computational resources to explain how one can gain knowledge of actions that are 
potentiated by surrounding structures; (iii) it only covers the part of the perceptual field 
within the scope of our attention, but the affordances we perceive do not reduce to the 
object or state of affairs our attention is focused on at time t; (iv) it can only work if a 
first layer of affordances is available: motor simulation cannot explain affordance 
perception, because its very functioning presupposes such perception1. 
These arguments do not demonstrate that STAP is false in itself; they only show that 
its scope must be reconsidered. Motor simulation is probably centrally involved in 
situations where an explicit evaluation of action feasibility is engaged (that is, situations 
where what can or will be done is for the main part already decided), but it cannot 
account for possibilities for which such assessment is lacking, i.e. the greater part of the 
affordances we are aware of. Other mechanisms must consequently be hypothesized. 
It should be noted that it is not the aim of this paper to propose any model of such 
mechanisms. Our objective is to demonstrate why STAP is not enough to explain 
affordance perception, it is not to explain how affordances are perceived. In that respect, 
our contribution is threefold: (a) we propose a more limited scope for STAP, which in 
our view makes its claim more consistent; (b) we propose to distinguish between (here 
and now) feasible actions and possible actions, which can help to clarify the current 
debate on motor simulation and affordance; (c) we propose a new perspective on the 
function of motor simulation in the cognitive mechanisms underlying the awareness of 
what can be done in the environment. 
 
2. Affordances cannot be reduced to currently available action 
possibilities 
A first argument that can be made against STAP relates to the meaning of the concept 
of affordance itself, and posits that affordance, as defined by Gibson and his followers, 
                                                 
1
 The hypothesis that motor simulation is necessary for affordance perception is also challenged by 
neuropsychological data. For instance, Negri et al. (2007) have described post-stroke apraxic patients who 
are severely impaired in using or mimic the use of common objects – what suggests that brain 
mechanisms responsible for motor control are impaired – but can still recognize them and identify their 
functional properties, and other patients showing symmetric patterns of performances. As the authors 
explain, those data suggest ‘that the processes subserving object use are not necessary in order to 
recognize and understand objects, and vice versa’. Although important, our claim in this paper will 
however not lean on such data, preferring instead more fundamental issues. 
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is simply not compatible with the use made by STAP. This claim can be supported by 
the two following statements: (1) affordances are not representations; (2) affordances 
refer to actions that are possible in principle for a referent system, not to actions that are 
currently feasible (can be performed here and now) for this system. 
A constitutive aspect of STAP is the challenging of Gibson’s conception of affordance 
perception as direct, i.e. not mediated by representational content or inference 
mechanism. According to STAP, the perceptual access to actions afforded by 
surrounding structures is mediated by dynamic motor representations relying on the 
same neural processes as effective motor execution. As explained by Möller, ‘the 
“utility” of objects is not directly “offered” by the external world, but determined by the 
generation of sensorimotor hypotheses based on the sensory input’ (Möller, 1999). 
STAP thus ‘replaces the direct perception of affordances by a mental simulation process 
based on internal models’ (Schenck, 2009), and adds a third term to the relation 
between action and perception (Jeannerod & Gallagher, 2002; Garbarini & Adenzato, 
2004). 
However, the question arises as to whether STAP supporters and Gibson are really 
talking about the same thing. Can we still speak of affordances once admitted that they 
are (internally) represented?  
A point frequently made by Gibson and his followers is that affordances are true 
physical (although relational and dispositional) properties of the physical reality 
(Gibson, 1986: 140-141; Turvey, 1974, 1992). Their existence does not depend on the 
individual’s current needs, or attention and perception processes (Gibson, 1986: 138-
139), and they cannot be equated to a kind of mental representation, e.g., instrumental 
or functional representation (Chemero & Turvey, 2007). The use STAP supporters, 
typically authors like Ellis & Tucker (2000), make of the notion of affordances is 
consequently not gibsonian: undoubtedly, the facilitation effects they observe suggest 
that in a way or another ‘seen objects potentiate a range of actions associated with 
them’, but calling affordances the representation of the motor patterns that are 
automatically activated during the visual processing of e.g. reachable or graspable 
objects is a misunderstanding (see Michaels, 2003: 136). 
However, this is not the point I would like to insist on here. In my view, another 
crucial feature of affordances, related to their very nature of being merely possible 
actions, is missed by STAP. Affordances, although relative to some characteristics, 
dispositional properties or potential behaviours of the individual (what ecological 
theorists call his “effectivities”), are not conditioned in their existence by the actual 
realizability or even availability of those behaviours2. Afforded actions – e.g., climbing 
stairs – have the subject’s effectivities in their conditions of actualisation: they are only 
possible given those effectivities (Turvey, 1992), but they remain possible even if such 
conditions are not immediately fulfillable. Stairs afford climbing, even if I cannot climb 
them right now3. They afford climbing for systems able to climb them in situations 
where a climbing behaviour is actualizable. In short, affordances refer to “could”, not to 
“can” actions: the resources that the environment offers exist – and can therefore be 
perceived – whether or not currently exploitable by the individual4. 
                                                 
2
 To the extent of my knowledge, this point is not highlighted as such by Gibson and his followers. In my 
opinion, it is nevertheless in line with their claims. 
3
 Even more radically, one could defend with Michaels (2003) – and against authors as Kadar & Shaw 
(2000) – that the affordances we perceive do not have to possess any counterpart in our own behavioural 
abilities. 
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 This claim probably does not apply to all kinds of affordances. For instance, it could be stated that an 
affordance as reachability of objects necessarily refers to the possibility of reaching the objects here and 
now, given the relative position of our body and the reach of our arm. Current exploitability would be in 
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Why is this conception of affordances not compatible with the claim made by STAP 
supporters? The simulation-based affordance perception process described by STAP is 
clearly centred on the current characteristics, situation and dispositions of the individual 
performing it. Motor simulation is used to determine whether an action is feasible under 
the conditions specified by the current input (e.g., optic signal), given the current state 
of the body (e.g., the position of the arm), not whether it is feasible in itself or, say, in 
other specified circumstances. Therein lies the problem: a process determining if the 
action of making use of an object is feasible in current circumstances cannot decide 
whether this object has or has not the related affordance. As explained above, its 
affordances do not depend on what can be done right now. Motor simulation thus 
appears inappropriate to mediate perceptual access to affordances. The only thing 
simulation can do is to determine whether a specified action taking advantage of a 
specified affordance will be a success or a failure given current circumstances. 
Supporting this view, recent studies have shown that the observation of graspable 
objects triggers activity in the motor cortex only when objects fall within the reaching 
space of the subject, suggesting that motor simulation is not involved for objects located 
too far to be grasped (Cardellicchio et al. 2011; see also Costantini et al., 2010, 2011). 
Yet this is not because the object is beyond reach that it is not graspable and perceived 
as such. From the moment that an object has suitable properties – e.g. size, form, 
material – it affords grasping, whether within or beyond reach. 
For the sake of clarity, two kinds of “potential actions” consequently need to be 
distinguished when analysing perceptual access to so-called affordances: (a) actions that 
are possible in principle with the object (for a referent system), even if such actions are 
currently unavailable (the cup is graspable even if I am too far to grasp it); (b) actions 
that are currently feasible (or assumed to be) given our position and state (the cup, 
which is located within the reach of my arm, can be grasped). The latter kind can be 
regarded as a subset of the former. 
Although necessary to delineate the exact scope of STAP, the previous criticism, 
however, remains of limited impact, when taken in isolation. Because it foremost deals 
with the meaning of the affordance concept, revising or simply challenging this 
meaning is sufficient to overcome it. One may in particular reject the previous 
considerations precisely because they promote a conception of affordances too 
independent of the situation, needs, goals, and mental states of the individual. After all, 
if, as stated by Gibson, affordances are not intrinsic physical properties, but relative to a 
system able to exploit them, should we not hold that they only exist when the 
circumstances for their exploitation are met, i.e. when they are currently feasible? What 
is the point in claiming that the cup is catchable “in principle”, if it is catchable only 
when located at the correct height and grasp distance, and because I have hands to catch 
it? We could however expatiate on these issues for a long time, each of the two 
perspectives described having advantages and disadvantages (Michaels, 2003). The only 
thing we need to acknowledge at this step is that “possible” and “feasible” actions are 
two distinct categories, and that STAP probably exclusively covers the latter. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
that case a constitutive component of the affordance. But this is clearly not the case for other types of 
affordances: a given solid surface affords support for standing and walking even if I am not in position to 
use it or – more radically – even if I am, for any reason, unable to use it (I might be paralysed). For the 
present purposes, this question can however remain open. 
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3. Insights from robotic research 
Another set of arguments challenging STAP hypothesis can be drawn from the robotic 
research literature. As mentioned in the introduction, STAP is not only defended in the 
field of neuropsychology, several attempts have been made to use the simulation 
framework to provide artificial systems with categorization skills supporting 
anticipation of behavioural possibilities afforded by objects (Möller, 1999; Ziemke el 
al., 2005; Hesslow & Jirenhed, 2007; Hoffman, 2007; Erdemir et al., 2008; Schenck, 
2009; Schenck et al., 2012). Assuming that ‘mental imagery could be the basis for the 
detection of affordances in visual perception’, e.g. Schenk et al. (2012) have used motor 
simulation algorithms to enable a mobile robot equipped with a camera to distinguish 
between types of obstacle arrangements: pass-through-able versus non-pass-through-
able corridors (dead ends). 
The success of STAP in the field of robotics is easily explained: building robots able 
to detect affordances would have indisputable practical benefits, e.g., for army or space 
clones design5. But application issues are not the only reason why STAP hypothesis is 
attractive for roboticists. The idea, which was first formulated by early AI theorists, like 
H.A. Simon (1969) and H.L. Dreyfus (1972), is now well known: artificial intelligence 
systems design can be considered an empirical method to test theoretical hypothesis on 
the nature and mechanisms of cognition. If you can build a robot whose behaviour relies 
on motor simulation and which behaves as living systems perceiving affordances 
behave, you will bring empirical support to the thesis that motor simulation is the kind 
of information processing mechanism such systems use to detect affordances. 
However, as will be shown hereafter, achievements of roboticists are far from 
providing such support to STAP, quite the contrary in fact. This is not to say that 
engineering failures cast doubt on the theoretical relevance of STAP. Building machines 
reproducing natural cognitive processes can fail (or succeed) for a lot of extra-
theoretical reasons. As far as I know, attempts of STAP roboticists were in fact rather 
successful. The point I want to make is somewhat different: the attempts of roboticists 
to build machines able to perceive affordances challenge the claims made by STAP 
because they highlight concretely some implementation problems such hypothesis is 
faced with. This is the reason they are considered in this paper, regardless of their 
failure or success. 
3.1 Motor simulation is neither motor imagery nor sensorimotor emulation 
Before discussing the achievements of roboticists, some terminological remarks on 
the meaning of the concepts of (a) mental imagery, (b) motor simulation and (c) 
sensorimotor emulation, are necessary. Indeed, most researchers in robotics confound 
motor imagery, which is a kind of mental imagery, with motor simulation, and they talk 
of motor simulation when they think of sensorimotor emulation. 
(a) As the name implies, mental imagery is an imagery process, and is consequently in 
a way or another related to images. This is not to say that it is an intrinsically visual 
process: mental imagery can clearly encompass the contribution of other modalities: 
you can imagine you hear a sound or feel something by touch (for recent reviews, see 
Iachini, 2011; Madan & Singhal, 2012). In principle, we could assume that such a 
process is either explicit, for instance when you consciously imagine you rotate your 
hand to catch an object, or implicit, i.e., is not accompanied by a conscious display of 
the events, objects or states of affairs being represented. Most STAP roboticists and 
                                                 
5
 For a recent review of the use of the concept of affordance in robotics, see Sahin et al. (2007). 
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authors such as Grush (2003) make use of the notion of motor or mental imagery to 
refer to robotic simulation processes, which, as far as we can judge, are not 
accompanied by awareness. But for sake of precision it is probably better to hold that 
imagery involves by definition a conscious experience: if there is no awareness of the 
process being simulated, it is simply not imagery. To say it metaphorically, an image 
needs a screen to be displayed. In the rest of the paper, we will consequently keep the 
concept of mental imagery for conscious processes of imagining something (i.e., 
imagination in the usual sense). 
(b) Motor (or action) simulation refers to a quite different process, namely a dynamic 
representation of body activity and interactions. It consequently involves a model of the 
body, for instance its biomechanical structure, its capacities and the energetic cost of 
actions, and possibly a functional representation of tools or other artefacts and external 
resources we can use to reach a goal. Unlike mental imagery, motor simulation is not 
necessarily a conscious process. According to most neuroscientists, motor simulation 
plays its role in motor cognition in a purely implicit way (Parsons, 1994; Decety, 
1996b; Jeannerod & Frak, 1999). You can be aware of the motor simulation process 
being engaged (more precisely: motor simulation can have a conscious output). This is 
typically the case in mental rotation tasks that are body-centred: you can imagine 
yourself rotating your hand. You can also imagine that you use a tool to do something 
or that you walk from one place to another. However, such experience probably implies 
some additional processes compared with purely implicit motor simulation (basically 
the mechanism making us aware of the simulation performed). It is consequently better 
to use the concept of motor imagery – a kind of mental imagery process – to refer to the 
former. 
(c) Sensorimotor emulation is still a different thing. It relates to the anticipation of the 
changes in the sensory input that a given motor action will (or at least should) lead to, 
e.g., the optic expansion flow occurring during our ambulatory movement or the 
displacement of a given pattern in the optical field following eye movements. It is a 
pure “calculation” process, and does not need any consciousness or even intentional (in 
the broad sense of “aboutness”) component. Emulators are forward models, and a lot of 
artificial intelligence systems make use of such models to regulate their activity, for 
instance systems for ship navigation or robotic arms control (Grush, 2003; Schenck, 
2009). Sensorimotor emulation has thus a quite different meaning than motor 
simulation. In a way, sensorimotor emulation is always involved in motor simulation (as 
well as in mental imagery: in mental rotation tasks, one can imagine what modifications 
in the visual appearance of the object will be induced by its rotation), but motor 
simulation works at a more macroscopic and sophisticated level of representation. What 
is simulated by motor simulation processes has a more “concrete” format than raw 
sensory input or signals: motor simulation deals with kinetic components of actions and 
spatial and dynamic features of body and objects (Grush, 2004). 
Although they are frequently confused, motor simulation must consequently be 
clearly distinguished from mental imagery as well as sensorimotor emulation: (i) Unlike 
mental imagery, which is explicit and does not necessarily involve a representation of 
body activity (you can rotate an object “in your head” to find its symmetric axis – a 
classical task in mind games – without imagining that you use your hands), motor 
simulation can be – and is most of the time – implicit and always works with models of 
the body. (ii) Unlike sensorimotor emulation, which refers to a blind calculation process 
of sensory inputs, motor simulation works with a more sophisticated representation 
format (broadly speaking: perception, not sensation), and the simulated action sequence 
can be consciously experienced (we talk in this case of motor imagery). 
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3.2 Sensorimotor emulation is not sufficient to predict actions potentiated 
by objects 
On the basis of this conceptual clarification, it must first be emphasised that STAP 
hypothesis refers in principle to motor simulation, not to mental imagery. Obviously, 
you don’t have to explicitly imagine yourself sitting on this chair to perceive it affords 
“sittability”: most often you “see” this “sittability” (or you “know” the chair is 
“sittable”: you take for granted that it could be used to sit) without even paying attention 
to it. Mental imagery could also lack some characteristics of action representation that 
seem essential to build realistic representations (i.e., to represent feasible, not fanciful 
actions), as sensitiveness to biomechanical constraints. As outlined by Johnson (2000), 
‘transformations of visual mental images are well known to follow the shortest path 
irrespective of such boundaries’6. 
The same kind of remarks applies in theory to sensorimotor emulation. If an 
information processing mechanism must be able to determine what actions are feasible 
in the environment, it cannot merely emulate the sensory input changes that should be 
induced by the motor command. Yet, as mentioned in the previous section, motor 
simulation and sensorimotor emulation are frequently confused by STAP supporters, 
especially in the robotics literature. Schenck (2009) and Schenck et al. (2012), for 
instance, claim that affordance perception relies on emulation mechanisms predicting 
the sensory consequences of motor commands (what they improperly call mental 
imagery or mental simulation process), and that such mechanisms can empower robots 
with the ability to perceive what their environment affords, for example dead end 
corridors, and regulate accordingly their behaviour: robots do not have to enter such 
corridors to “understand” that they will confront with a dead end; by processing the 
current input of the camera with emulation algorithms, they can directly categorize the 
corridor structure as not-pass-through-able. 
However, predicting the sensory consequences of a given motor command (or 
sequence of motor commands, whatever), i.e. the changes in sensory input, say in the 
optic array, that this command should produce, is clearly not sufficient to assess the 
feasibility of a given action in a given context. Actions that can be undertaken with a 
given object cannot be predicted on the sole basis of the anticipation of changes in 
sensory input. As Cisek (2007) explains, ‘specification of actions [...] requires 
information about the spatial relationships among objects and surfaces in the world, 
represented in a coordinate frame relative to the orientation and configuration of the 
animal’s body’. To represent an action sequence as grasping an object or using a 
wrench, the system must take into account its spatial, dynamic and physical properties, 
for instance the position in space and the velocity of the arm during the different phases 
of the action, or the muscular effort that should be provided to master the inertial 
properties of the limb or the weight of the tool. As we have seen in the previous section, 
only motor simulation represents such properties when playing in advance action 
sequences. Only motor simulation has consequently the representational resources to 
                                                 
6
 This claim could be discussed. Several studies have shown that some of the constraints on overt action 
were preserved in motor imagery, as Fitt’s law or time and energetic constraints on body displacement 
(Decety & Jeannerod, 1996). Decety & Sommerville (2007) thus claim that ‘one reason why motor 
imagery allows us to plan actual actions is that the constraints of the physical world shape our imagery in 
a manner similar to how they shape our actions.’ However, those observations do not demonstrate that 
mental – or motor – imagery necessarily complies with such constraints. After all, one can imagine 
oneself performing “impossible” actions, as flying, running as fast as a car or lifting mountains, or one 
can e.g. imagine that one’s arm can stretch to catch distant objects as in Witt & Profitt (2008)’s study. 
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predict action feasibility. Sensorimotor emulation precisely works at the sensorimotor 
level, where the information necessary to evaluate such feasibility is not available. 
3.3 Predicting actions in an uneventful microworld is not the same as in an 
unpredictable reality 
Another kind of difficulty STAP is faced with is related to the problem of the 
computational resources that should be available to simulate affordances related actions. 
This can be understood from the reflections proposed by Hesslow (2002). According to 
Hesslow (2002), motor simulation can be used to represent and assess the feasibility of 
extended behavioural sequences. ‘Once the mechanism of anticipation is in place, 
perceptual activity generated by a simulated action can serve as a stimulus for a new 
response, and so on […], thus enabling long chains of simulated responses and 
perceptions.’ The problem-solving process involved in tasks as the “Tower of London” 
is a typical example of such a mechanism. One may however be sceptical about the 
extension of this hypothesis to ecological situations of interaction with the environment. 
The real world is far more complex than the “Tower of London” microworld, where 
possible configurations and actions can be counted on the fingers of one hand. 
Obviously, the number of iterative steps the simulation process can achieve should be 
drastically reduced because of the combinatorial explosion of possibilities implied by 
the unpredictability of the real environment. Admittedly, in a sense this unpredictability 
only applies to details; the overall scenario is usually uneventful. But this is not this 
scenario that the simulation process must anticipate. To determine whether a given 
action is feasible in the situation, e.g. grasping an object, the motor simulation process 
must reflect accurately the properties of the body, its position in space and grasping 
capacities, as well as the current characteristics of the object in the environment: if not, 
the prediction will prove wrong. 
In fact, even in ultra-simplified microworld situations, the process of anticipation 
quickly faces with computational limits. This is something AI theorists such as John 
McCarthy and Marvin Minsky have widely shown while studying chess. The 
computational resources of a Deep blue are required when it comes to predicting the 
possible game configurations and evaluate their interest several steps ahead. In one way 
or another, it is possible to anticipate the possibilities made available by a complex 
situation. This is what we all do constantly. And for this, we probably make use of 
‘internal models’ of the behaviour of agents and objects, including a so-called naive 
physics. But such a prediction relies on processes much more (or maybe less) complex 
than just emulating sensory consequences of actions, typically what AI researchers call 
heuristics: clever methods to reduce drastically the search space. 
Schenck et al. (2012)’s claims about the function motor simulation plays in action 
anticipation meet the same kind of difficulties. The authors oppose the motor 
simulation-based control of behaviour to the classical computo-symbolic approach in 
AI, and claim that the latter ‘is successful in well-controlled task domains with a 
restricted or well-known set of objects, but lacks the flexibility and adaptivity of human 
vision’. The problem is that the simulation-based approach they promote suffers from 
precisely the same limitations. As long as the robot operates in a microworld where the 
possible configurations of the environment and the possible behaviours are in limited 
number and known in advance, the actions that can be realized given the current state of 
affairs can be predicted using “motor simulation”. Things are nevertheless getting more 
complicated if the environment gets more complex and the action repertoire broader. A 
reliable anticipation of the consequences of actions certainly remains possible when 
only two alternative motor commands must be tested, as in the example proposed by 
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Schenck (2009) (although one quickly faces with a combinatorial explosion when 
pushing the simulation several steps in the future). But if the system only has to decide 
between two motor commands, it means that what it plans to (or can) do in the 
environment is almost already decided. The behavioural repertoire of a human being in 
ecological context is far more complex, as the motor programs that enable their 
achievement. 
The proposition that perceptual access to affordances is mediated by an action 
simulation mechanism is thus confronted with a computational reality principle. As long 
as a limited number of actions have to be simulated to determine what environment 
structures make it possible to do, the idea remains plausible, but if the repertoire of 
actions potentially relevant in a situation is broader (as we can assume it is the case in 
humans in ecological context), such a mechanism is no more sufficient. 
Möller (1999) was aware of that problem: ‘A drawback of the anticipation approach is 
the time required for the selection of appropriate actions: the agent has to simulate a 
number of sensorimotor sequences in order to find a sequence with a positive value that 
is suitable for execution.’ Hoffmann (2007) arrives at a similar conclusion: the kind of 
recursive search used in simulation algorithms ‘is computationally expensive and prone 
to prediction errors for large search depths. Thus, sensorimotor anticipation by itself 
cannot generate a behavior from sensory input by testing all possible movement 
variants. Instead, other processes need to trigger a suitable movement plan.’ 
Notwithstanding, for the authors this problem is partially solved if the system is 
provided with a mechanism enabling to associate the current situation (which acts, via 
the sensors, as input for the simulation process) and typical reactions. ‘That way, the 
search space for the motor commands is restricted and the effort in time is reduced: with 
features indicating an obstacle on the right, the simulation will preferably test 
movements to the left’ (Möller, 1999). One can only agree with such proposition, which 
indeed seems to correspond to a quite faithful description of our experience and 
behaviour in the real world: the potential actions we envisage in a given situation 
always appear constrained by our habits and some contextual knowledge of the situation 
and place where we are. The problem is that such considerations also imply a drastic 
weakening of the STAP hypothesis. If the system already knows what the typical ways 
to react in a given situation are, the biggest part of the path to explain how we get 
knowledge of what can be done with surrounding structures (or cannot be: passing 
through obstacles) has already been covered. 
What previous considerations thus suggest is that the mechanisms described by STAP 
already presuppose some perceptual knowledge of the action possibilities made 
available by the environment. This is the only way to avoid an infinite regression. STAP 
posits that access to affordances is enabled by a simulation process testing the feasibility 
of the afforded behaviour. The problem is however: how to determine, for a given 
object O, the actions (or, at another level of description, the motor programs) whose 
achievement should be simulated? If the system already knows those actions, does it not 
mean that it (at least partially) knows which affordances are potentiated by the object? 
Thinking about it, the solution to that Escherian problem is quite obvious: a first layer 
of affordances must already be available for the motor simulation mechanisms to work. 
This point is evident once recognized that motor simulation does not deal with 
(intrinsically) possible actions, but with (here and now) feasible actions. To determine if 
an object O supports the realization of a behaviour C1 of a behavioural repertoire {C1, 
..., Cn}, for instance if an object can be grasped using a thumb-index precision grip, in a 
way or another the object O must already have been apprehended as belonging to the 
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category of graspable objects, that is to say the objects which support in principle the 
achievement of such behaviour (solid objects within a certain range of sizes). 
 
4. Affordances we are perceptually aware of do not reduce to affordances 
we pay attention to 
STAP’s explanation of our perceptual access to affordances is also insufficient in 
different respects when taking into account the phenomenological properties of this 
access. 
A first argument in this regard, still related to the problem of computational resources 
discussed above, is that the affordances we are aware of at every moment are far too 
many for their realization to be simulated by the brain, no matter if in series or parallel. 
This point can be understood if we distinguish between central and peripheral 
perceptual awareness. 
In empirical studies described by STAP supporters (e.g. De’Sperati & Stucchi, 1997, 
2000; Tucker & Ellis, 1998, 2001, 2004; Ellis & Tucker, 2000; Coello & Delevoye-
Turrell, 2007; Witt & Proffitt, 2008), the individual is usually confronted with one 
specific object he has to categorize or toward which he must direct an action. But in 
ecological circumstances – typically in the rooms of a house – this is not one, but 
dozens or even hundreds of objects we perceive. Certainly, at every moment, our 
attentional focus is directed toward one single object, set of objects or process. We have 
nevertheless a peripheral perception of other surrounding objects. We are peripherally 
aware of their presence. And we implicitly know what they can be used for. In a way, 
such awareness even applies to objects that are outside our peripheral perceptual field, 
i.e., objects that do not appear but are nonetheless participating in the situation. I do not 
see the scissors lying on the desk behind my back. But I rely on their availability: the 
cutting action they enable belongs to my behavioural field. The same applies for any 
usable object located in our close environment, i.e., which is within range. We know 
that objects are available if we need them, and we know (more or less) where they are 
stored and how to find them. Without such peripheral knowledge, we could not know 
that we must go into the kitchen to get a glass of water, but into the living room for a 
glass of scotch. Our perceptual awareness of what stands around us would reduce to the 
sole part of the environment we are currently paying attention to. If, as stated by 
Garbarini & Adenzato (2004), ‘only by virtually executing the action can we understand 
the relational significance of the object, i.e., the affordance it offers’, it is consequently 
not one, but hundreds of action sequences that have to be processed to make us perceive 
the affordances our environment makes available. 
The problem of STAP is that it seems to reduce the perceptual field to the attentional 
field, or at least to hold that only the objects to which our attention is turned at time t are 
perceived as affording something, objects belonging to what Searle or other researchers 
call peripheral awareness being not considered in this manner (if having any perceptual 
reality). But just as there is a central and a peripheral vision, our perceptual awareness is 
divided into a central and a peripheral field. We have the impression that we are only 
aware of the portion of reality that is under attentional spotlight, but this is a mistake: 
we are constantly aware of the periphery, and this context or background contributes to 
determine the content of that which is the subject of our explicit perception7. When I am 
                                                 
7
 This point was especially made by Husserl: each perceived object is given with an external horizon, it is 
accompanied by a co-perception of other present objects and to which it is possible to turn. See e.g. 
Husserl (1950): §19. 
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visually aware of the coffee table in the living room, I do not perceive an object 
insulated from the rest of the world. The table is precisely perceived as being in the 
living room, which is in the house, which is in the city. The house, with all the objects – 
and related affordances – it contains, is, so to speak, co-perceived when I see the table. 
The awareness – more or less implicit – of being located in a certain place of the 
network of familiar places the world consists of encompasses an awareness – more or 
less implicit – of the behavioural resources made available by that place. I know I am at 
the office, in a restaurant, in the subway, on the street or at home in the living room. 
The “concept” of living room as it occurs in my experience of being somewhere 
includes the objects this place generally contains, with the actions they potentiate, 
somewhat in the style of Marvin Minsky’s frames8. 
One may retort that strictly speaking we only perceive the affordances in the beam of 
our attention at time t, that such peripheral awareness is illusory, and stems from our 
certainty of being able to turn our attention to the elements of the periphery9. But in this 
case how to explain that we know where to turn our attention? Most importantly, how to 
explain that when planning our behaviour we take into account opportunities for action 
provided by those structures that are not subject to direct perception? As Searle (2007) 
explains, the proof that such peripheral elements ‘are a part of my conscious field is that 
I can at any moment shift my attention to them. But in order for me to shift my attention 
to them, there must be something there which I was previously not paying attention to 
which I am now paying attention to.’ 
 
5. Motor simulation is not requested for affordances already specified by 
the structure of the perceptual field 
Next, one may be dubious about the interest – and thus cognitive reality – of 
simulating an action to evaluate whether it is afforded by the environment, when the 
spatial layout, to reuse Gibson’s expression, is sufficient to get such knowledge. 
Visual distance perception is a good illustration. In visual experience, the environment 
is organized along a gradient of distance. This gradient enables to locate objects in 
relation to our body, and assign to each a value in terms of accessibility: near means 
accessible, far means not directly accessible. This accessibility can for instance be 
specified in terms of walking time. Through the gradient of distance, we are thus 
immediately aware of what we can or cannot do. This is, so to say, explicit in the 
appearing structure of the spatial layout. 
Now, psychologists have long shown that the configuration of this gradient proceeds 
from the action of several static or dynamic optical variables (binocular disparity, height 
in the visual field, shadows and texture gradients of surfaces, relative sizes of objects, 
parallax, etc.). These variables together contribute to define the position of objects in the 
distance (Cutting & Vishton, 1995). Obviously, this mechanism does not need to 
simulate the action of accessing objects to work. You do not have to simulate the action 
of reaching for perceiving an object at ten meters as being beyond reach. The same goes 
for the reachability of nearby objects. The gradient of distance enables a direct 
apprehension of the (in)accessibility of surrounding structures. 
This does not imply that motor simulation cannot be involved in the visual perception 
of reachabiliy. But it will only intervene when other – more direct – reachability 
                                                 
8
 Based on Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of our everyday coping with objects, Turner (2005) 
makes a similar claim: affordances participate in a network and we never perceive them in isolation. 
9
 A similar argument was used by O’Regan & Noë (2001) against internalist approaches of perception. 
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estimation mechanisms lose their reliability, e.g. when an object to be grasped is located 
at the boundary of the arm reachable space. Supporting this view, Coello et al. (2008) 
have shown that transcranial magnetic stimulation of the motor cortex only interferes 
with judgments of reachability for targets located at the limits of reachable space, which 
tends to demonstrate ‘that action simulation would be required mainly when the 
determination of what is reachable becomes ambiguous’. The fact that the time required 
for judgments increases substantially for visual targets located in this critical area 
further supports this hypothesis (Bourgeois et al., 2009). 
The same conclusion can be drawn from the analysis of the visual perception of the 
solidity or impenetrability of objects. Seeing something as a solid object, seeing that 
there is an impenetrable structure in front of us: a table for example, means ipso facto 
taking for granted that some behavioural possibilities are available (we can put objects 
or sit on its surface), while others are neutralized (we have to walk around the table to 
pass). However, as in the case of distance, it is highly unlikely that the perception of 
such action possibilities and impossibilities relies on a motor simulation mechanism. 
Obviously, I do not have to simulate the contact between the object and my body to 
anticipate its impenetrability and related affordances. What would be the point? As 
shown by Gibson (1958), the optical array is already a reliable resource to specify solid 
surfaces. Moreover, impenetrability is not something one anticipates (except in 
situations of reduced vision, as in the fog), it is something one sees. As the saying goes, 
seeing is believing, and seeing something as solid means precisely counting on the 
possibilities potentiated by the solidity of the object, taking for granted their 
availability. 
Of course, the optical field taken as such is not sufficient to convey knowledge of 
what can be done in the environment. An object will be reachable only if it is located 
within the reach of a system possessing a reaching capacity. ‘Reachability is co-
determined by the characteristics of the object and those of the actor in terms of his/her 
capacity for action and situation in the environment’ (Rochat et al., 1999). Similarly, a 
solid object will only afford contact for a system having an impenetrable body. Yet, our 
body can serve as a metric to calibrate the optical field without the mediation of motor 
simulation (see e.g. Mark, 1987; Warren & Whang, 1987). For reachability, the only 
requisite is to “remember” the reach of our repeated arm movements using optical cues, 
i.e. to use the grasping distance as defined in the optical field as a metric to calibrate 
visual distances10 (the same mechanism could be used to calibrate the size of objects 
using the metric of our hand grip span). For solidity, it is to associate some optical 
invariant, as the opacity of surfaces, with the property of impenetrability. 
A similar claim could be made for affordances which do not seem to be directly 
accessible through spatial layout. For example, consider a lake covered with ice and the 
perception that its surface is strong enough to support our body: we perceive the surface 
as affording standing and walking. Do we need to simulate the activity of standing and 
                                                 
10
 Coello & Delevoye-Turrell (2007) have observed that when modifying the apparent extent of the 
reaching capacities of subjects by providing them with a fake visual feedback of the distances their arm 
can reach, the space they perceive as reachable runs a constriction. The authors explain this result by 
claiming that the perception of objects’ reachability relies on a motor simulation process using internal 
models of the biomechanical structure and action capability of the body: the visual bias alters the model 
of the body used to simulate actions, and thus alters the objective distance to which objects must be 
situated to be perceived as affording reaching. However, this observation does not prove that motor 
simulation is necessary for reachability perception, and it does not even prove that motor simulation is 
responsible of this distance constriction phenomenon. What this study shows is only that our perception 
of reachability is calibrated on our action capacities, and that those capacities play a metric role in the 
determination of visual distance. 
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walking on the lake (using internal models of our body’s weight and naive physics of 
the ice’s resistance) to perceive such affordances? The idea seems absurd. It is clear that 
other mechanisms support perceptual access to such affordances, typically simple visual 
cues: the aspect of the ice, its colour, transparency, if it seems thick, if it is already a 
little melted, and even more importantly, if others are already standing on it. 
 
6. Conclusion: motor simulation does not explain but presupposes 
affordance perception 
What previous considerations demonstrate is that motor simulation mechanisms, as 
described by STAP supporters, (1) only apply to objects we are explicitly paying 
attention to, not to all objects and related affordances we are aware of at time t; (2) can 
only work if some perceptual knowledge of the action possibilities made available by 
those objects is already available. Far from explaining affordance perception, the motor 
simulation framework thus presupposes such perception. 
It does not mean that motor simulation has no role to play in the cognitive process 
enabling the perception of action possibilities made available by the environment. 
Motor simulation is probably centrally involved when an explicit evaluation of action 
feasibility is engaged, and in critical situations, e.g. when an object to be grasped is 
located at the limits of reachable space (Coello et al., 2008). 
The investigation proposed in this paper also suggests that several categories of 
actions need to be distinguished to clarify the problem of how we perceive what 
surrounding objects afford: (i) actions that are in principle possible given the properties 
of the object (this cup is graspable for a standard human hand); (ii) actions that are 
immediately feasible, i.e. feasible here and now given my state and situation relative to 
the object (the cup within my arm’s reach is graspable); (iii) actions that are mediately 
feasible, i.e. which are only feasible if other actions are first performed (the cup beyond 
my arm’s reach is graspable only if I first move closer to it); (iv) actions that are 
potentially relevant in the situation, given my current objectives, capacities, resources 
(grasping this cup is relevant whenever I plan to drink my coffee). Perceptual awareness 
of what we can or cannot do in the environment in a way or another involves all those 








If motor simulation plays any role here, it can only be in the mechanisms assessing if 
a given (possible) action supported by a given environment structure is feasible in the 
situation, and it seems reasonable to assume, in line with Möller (1999) and Hoffmann 
(2007), that motor simulation will only be engaged to evaluate the feasibility of actions 
considered as contextually relevant (see Cisek, 2007, for a similar claim). Those two 
categories of action have to be clearly distinguished. Determining what is feasible 
(immediately or with a delay) is totally different from determining what is potentially 
relevant in a given situation. The relevance of an action above all depends on its 
capacity to fulfil some specified objectives (i.e., to be the means to achieve a goal). 
Besides, the fact that something cannot be done does not mean it is not relevant. Not 
currently feasible actions can be totally relevant to reach one objective, and taking into 
account such actions could be important in deciding what other resources than those 
currently available shall be provided to this end (Michaels, 2003). 
Strictly speaking, motor simulation thus cannot provide knowledge of what is possible 
to do with objects (affordances). The best it can tell is whether an action already 
identified as possible and relevant can be performed in present circumstances. 
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